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I. INTRODUCTION
Compulsory arbitration of age discrimination claims under
individual employment contracts does not conflict with the legislative
intent of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and
therefore should be upheld as consistent with the Supreme Court's clear
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements. The Third Circuit's decision
in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc.2 and legislation recently
introduced in Congress3 both misconstrue the purpose of the ADEA with
respect to arbitration and waiver agreements. An individual employment
agreement to arbitrate all disputes, entered into voluntarily and knowingly,
must be upheld to protect the intent of the parties and their freedom to
contract. In contrast to a waiver agreement, under an agreement to
arbitrate an employee is merely agreeing to settle the dispute through
arbitration, rather than waiving his or her rights under the dispute.
In Nicholson, the plaintiff was hired by CPC International, Inc.
(CPC) in 1957 as an attorney, and was eventually promoted to Vice-
President for Corporate Financial Services in 1981. In 1986, apparently
in anticipation of a possible takeover move, all corporate officers were
presented with an executive employment agreement, which Nicholson
signed. The agreement included the following arbitration clause:
Any dispute or controversy arising under or in connection with
this Agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration,
conducted before a panel of three arbitrators in New York City in
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association
then in effect. Judgment may be entered on the arbitrators' award
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (defining "age" as 40-65), as amended by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256 (age limit
raised to 70 for nonfederal employees and removed entirely in covered federal employees),
and by the Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592 (removed upper age limit for almost
all covered employees).
2. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
3. S. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989)
[hereinafter Bills] (both bills would have curtailed firms' use of waivers to protect
themselves from workers' suits under the ADEA). Neither bill was enacted and no similar
bills are now being considered by Congress.
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in any court having jurisdiction. The expense of such arbitration
shall be borne by the Company.4
Approximately one year later Nichilson was informed that his position
was being eliminated in a corporate restructuring. He filed a timely age
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and subsequently filed a private action. The district
court denied CPC's motion for an order to compel arbitration and the
court of appeals affirmed.
By analyzing court decisions about arbitration agreements in the
commercial setting and employment disputes, the language and legislative
history of the ADEA, and public policy concerns, this Note will discuss
why the Nicholson court erroneously failed to enforce a legitimate
agreement to arbitrate.
Il. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN COMMERICAL TRANSACTIONS
In considering the viability of agreements to arbitrate employment
disputes involving ADEA claims, both the courts and Congress should
look at the Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning arbitration of
claims in the commercial setting. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,' the Court said that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)6
establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration that the courts must en-
force.7 The Court upheld an arbitration clause on claims under § 10(b) of
the 1984 Securities Exchange Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). The Court emphasized that "this duty to
enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by
an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights."' Instead, the
Court put the burden on the party opposing arbitration to show that
Congress intended to preclude waivers of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue. 9 Thus, under the test for arbitration set forth in
McMahon, Nicholson, the employee, had the burden to demonstrate that
Congress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims
arising under the ADEA in order to avoid compulsory arbitration under
the agreement he signed with his employer.
4. Nicholsonv. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1989).
5. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (§ 2 declares as a matter of federal law that arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.').
7. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 227.
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In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp. ,"o the Fourth Circuit applied
the McMahon test and upheld an agreement to arbitrate ADEA claims.
The court stated that "we find no congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the ADEA's text, its legislative
history, or its underlying purposes . . . . " The court interpreted
McMahon as holding that "[a]n arbitration agreement is unenforceable
only if Congress has evinced an intention to preclude waiver of the
judicial forum for a particular statutory right, or if the agreement was
procured by fraud or use of excessive economic power.
" 2
The Supreme Court upheld the arbitrability of claims arising under
the Sherman Act in the international commerce setting in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.3 "By agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum."1 4  The Court indicated that the parties' bargain to
arbitrate should be upheld unless the paty opposing arbitration of the
claim could prove congressional intent to the contrary.
In a recent case on the subject, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,s the Court again upheld the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, this time under the Securities Act
of 1933. In reiterating the federal policy favoring arbitration as a means
of securing prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies,1 6
the Court said that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the
Securities Act of 1933 are enforceable, absent fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of the
contract. In explaining its decision, the Court said that arbitration
agreements, like forum-selection clauses, "advance the objective of
allowing buyers of securities a broader right to select the forum for
resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise."17
These recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate a strong
presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements in the
commercial setting, which should be extended to the employment area.
10. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
11. Id. at 196.
12. Id. at 196-97 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 627-28 (1985) and Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
226 (1987)).
13. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
14. Id. at 628.
15. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
16. Id. at 479-80.
17. Id. at 482-83.
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III. ARBITRATION IN EMPLOYMENT DisPums
Arbitration agreements in employment contracts hold many of the
same benefits sanctioned by the Court in the commercial arbitration cases
discussed above. In his strong dissent in Nicholson, Judge Becker
commented on the applicability of arbitration to employment disputes. He
pointed out that arbitrators have broad equitable and remedial powers and
that waivers must be knowing and voluntary to be enforceable. 1 He
argued that traditional suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening
the protections afforded by substantive law are inconsistent and out-of-
step with the judiciary's current, strong endorsement of federal statutes
favoring arbitration to resolve disputes.' 9 He also pointed out that if the
Supreme Court has approved of the use of arbitration involving the factual
and legal complexities of antitrust and securities claims, certainly ADEA
claims do not involve more complex matters than arbitrators can handle."
In deciding the arbitration issue, the court in Nicholson looked first
to the text of the ADEA. The statute does not contain explicit language
as to the effect of an arbitration agreement on ADEA rights. .The ADEA
puts enforcement power in the EEOC. Thus, a claimant must first file an
administrative complaint with the EEOC and wait sixty days until the
agency considers the charge before he can file a suit.2' The ADEA must
be enforced pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).22 This
requirement led to the court's discussion as to whether ADEA claims
should follow precedents set in FLSA cases involving collective
bargaining agreements.
The Nicholson court tried to draw analogies between ADEA cases
and those decided under FLSA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a
case involving race discrimination, the Supreme Court held in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co.23 that Title VII rights are not waivable by a
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate disputes?4 In Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court held that wage
disputes involving FLSA rights are not waivable by a collective bargaining
agreement. In addition, arbitration decisions were held to have no
18. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 24041 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, C.J.,
dissenting).
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988).
22. Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938 § 1, as amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1982).
23. 415 U.S. 36 (1974), cen. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976).
24. See also Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989).
25. 450 U.S. 728 (1981), cet. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
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preclusive effect on § 1983 claims in federal courts in McDonald v. City
of West Branch.2
ADEA cases can be clearly distinguished from these cases for
several reasons. First, FLSA cases often involve collective bargaining
agreements. In those cases, courts may be more likely to provide
protections of claimants who did not individually or voluntarily submit to
a binding arbitration agreement. Binding arbitration was instead agreed to
between the union and the employer, perhaps even without the employee's
actual knowledge. As Judge Becker pointed out in his Nicholson dissent,
the Supreme Court's rationale in these cases may have been based on
distrust of unions and the fear that a union's control over the arbitral
process could lead to loss of an individual's rights. 7 None of the cases
discussed above involved an individual agreement between an employer
and an employee, which was the situation in the Nicholson case.
Furthermore, Nicholson involved an agreement-to-arbitrate case, which
can be clearly distinguished from the waiver cases. A waiver is "the
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right."' This case
involves an arbitration clause which is "a clause inserted in a contract
providing for compulsory arbitration in case of dispute as to rights or
liabilities under such contract. "29
Commentators and the courts seem to disagree in ADEA cases as
to the application of the Supreme Court's prohibition of waivers and
agreements to arbitrate in certain Title VII, FLSA, and § 1983 cases,
especially in light of the Supreme Court's vigorous approval of arbitration
agreements in the commercial setting. Several commentators feel
arbitrators may be better able than courts to deal with disturbances in
employment relationships, because of arbitrators' expertise "for
understanding and seeing the complexity in human interactions, and
making and conditioning decisions in such a way as to make long-term
interactions viable. "30 These commentators state that "[c]ourts have been
less adept . . . in responding to events which are merely symptoms of
some continuing underlying disturbances in personal relationships."i'
Thus, arbitrators may indeed be better suited than courts to deal with
cases in which an age-protected claimant, who was in a long-term
26. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
27. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, C.J.,
dissenting).
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979).
29. Id. at 96.
30. Clark & Bush, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: A Need for
Statutory Reform?, 11 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 47, 55 (1985).
31. Id. at 54.
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relationship with an employer, seeks to rescind an agreement to arbitrate
and files an ADEA claim.
Another commentator suggests that congressional preference for
informal, out-of-court solutions to problems of employment discrimination
is even more practical in ADEA cases where the outcome is highly
uncertain. He states that "incorporation of Title VII's conciliation
provision [into ADEA] should . . . be interpreted as reflecting a favorable
attitude toward all recognized mechanisms of out-of-court dispute
resolution, including private waiver."
32
The courts are split in regard to the waivability of ADEA claims
and the effect of agreements to arbitrate. These discrepancies must be
resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress in order to allow both
employers and employees some predictability as to the effectiveness of the
voluntary agreements they sign. In 1989, two bills put before Congress,
S. 54 and H.R. 14 3 2 ,3 sought to curtail employers' use of waivers to
protect themselves from workers' suits under the ADEA. The House bill
would have allowed waivers only if the waivers were supervised by a
court or part of a bona fide age discrimination claim filed with the EEOC,
in court, or submitted in writing to an employer. The Senate bill would
have allowed waivers only if they are supervised by the EEOC. Neither
bill was enacted and no similar proposals are now before Congress.
Furthermore, neither bill specifically dealt with the question of agreements
to arbitrate.
Agreements to arbitrate ADEA disputes were upheld in Gilmer,
where the court stated that "arbitration is a forum selected by mutual
agreement of the parties. Congress' choice of an enforcement scheme in
which ADEA suits are brought in a judicial forum simply does not
manifest an intention to prevent parties from reaching a private contractual
agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration. " 4  In October, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on Gilmer with regard to the question of
whether claims brought pursuant to the ADEA are subject to compulsory
arbitration.
In EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., the Fifth Circuit upheld the waiver of
employee rights to file private ADEA lawsuits and rights to recover in
suits brought by the EEOC on employee's behalf. s However, that court
held that the waiver of the right to file the EEOC charge is void as
against public policy. The court explained that the function of an ADEA
charge is to put the EEOC on notice of a possible violation, not to initiate
32. Comment, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (emphasis in original).
33. See Bills, supra note 3.
34. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 1990).
35. 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
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a lawsuit.3 Thus, the court upheld the validity of a private, unsupervised
waiver of an ADEA cause of action by an employee as long as the waiver
was "voluntary and knowing." The Cosmair court properly upheld the
right of private parties to make agreements and still protected the public
policy interests of EEOC enforcement of the ADEA claims.
In Gilmer, the court found that the EEOC's continued effectiveness
was not dependent on its participation in the resolution of all claims under
ADEA. The court went on to state that:
We are reluctant to conclude that the mere fact of administrative
involvement in a statutory scheme of enforcement operates as an
implicit exception to the presumption of arbitral availability under
the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]. . . . mhe roles of arbitration
and the EEOC are harmonious because neither the filing of an
individual charge nor an action of agency enforcement is in any
way forbidden by the election of arbitration.'
In EEOC v. United States Steel Corp. ,M a district court found that
a company policy requiring employees to sign waiver agreements as a
condition to receiving specified retirement pensions was not proper
because of its "chilling effect" on those who filed ADEA charges, as well
as those who had not, and because the waivers were not voluntary and
knowing regardless of whether they were part of a settlement. 39 However,
in analogizing ADEA to Title VII claims, the court did recognize that an
employee could waive a cause of action as part of a settlement if the
employee's consent was "voluntary and knowing. " 4° Among the factors
the court found dispositive of the voluntary and knowing requirement
were degree of negotiations, presence or absence of counsel, explanation
or lack of explanation with respect to release, and straightforwardness or
ambiguity of the language of the release. These factors should be applied
to all ADEA arbitration and waiver cases, as opposed to the per se
prohibition declared by the Nicholson court.
The Sixth Circuit put forth the strongest support among the circuit
courts for upholding the private, unsupervised release of ADEA claims.
36. Id. at 1089.
37. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 1990).
38. 583 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
39. See also Handley v. Phillips, 715 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (collective
bargaining agreement for binding arbitration of suspension and termination of employees did
not preclude plaintiff's rights to file ADEA claim).
40. EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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In Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp.,4t the court held that there is
not an absolute bar to release of claims under the ADEA, even though
FLSA enforcement provisions have been incorporated into the act. The
court stressed that the ADEA "addresses itself to an entirely different
segment of employees [than the FLSA], many of whom were highly paid
and capable of securing legal assistance without difficulty,' as opposed
to the group protected by the FLSA, which mainly consists of lower paid,
less educated employees with little understanding of their legal rights.
The court approved of the "practice, even if not officially sanctioned, ...
that permits effectuating and recognizing settlements of ADEA disputes
that employees and employers have worked out in good faith without
[EEOC] agency involvement."o In that case the plaintiff was an
experienced labor lawyer who was age fifty-three when he was hired, and
fifty-nine when let go for unsatisfactory performance. The employee
mentioned at the time of his termination that he felt it was related to age
discrimination but still signed a waiver agreement. The court justifiably
refused to let the plaintiff use an ambiguity in the ADEA to take
advantage of his employer. Furthermore, the Runyan court held that the
waiver applied to ADEA claims even though the agreement did not
explicitly refer to ADEA claims, basing its decision on ordinary contract
principles. 44
The Runyan court took a much more practical approach to the
ADEA waiver issue by looking at the particular facts of the case to
determine if an unsupervised release of a claim is valid under the
particular circumstances of the case. In Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick
Honda Co., the Eighth Circuit considered relevant the fact that the
plaintiff in an ADEA waiver case "was a well-paid management employee
who ha[d] experience in business and who ha[d] signed numerous
contracts in his lifetime" in upholding the waiver signed by the
employee.'
A similar case-by-case analysis should be used in cases involving
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes. In Nicholson the court took
little notice of the fact that the plaintiff was an experienced attorney and
had been an executive with the company for twenty-five years. The
common fears of disparity of bargaining power and lack of legal expertise
41. 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986). See also
Shaheen v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 873 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1989); Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co.,
862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d
1026 (8th Cir. 1986).
42. Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1986).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1044, n.10.
45. 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1987).
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were clearly not present in the case. Furthermore, there was no evidence
of coercion or threats of termination for failure to sign the arbitration
agreement.
In Goff v. Kroger Co., while refusing to grant the defendant
employer a summary judgment enforcing an arbitration agreement, the
court nonetheless stated that courts must consider the particular
circumstances of each case carefully to determine whether the release of
plaintiff's rights under the ADEA were knowingly and deliberately
waived. In discussing Runyan, the court stressed the importance of the
fact that the plaintiff was an experienced labor lawyer.'
The EEOC has approved of private, unsupervised waivers of
ADEA claims if they meet the following requirements: they are knowing
and voluntary, they do not provide for the release of prospective rights or
claims, and they are not in exchange for consideration that includes
employment benefits to which the employee is already entitled.' While
these guidelines may not allow for the automatic approval of all waivers
or agreements to arbitrate, they are a clear indication by the agency that
private waivers of ADEA claims are appropriate under certain
circumstances.
The EEOC considers the following as relevant factors of the
"voluntary and knowing" standard: "(i) if the agreement was in writing,
and in understandable and clear language; (ii) whether a reasonable period
of time was provided for employee deliberation; and (iii) whether the
employee was encouraged to consult with an attorney. " ' If the EEOC,
the ADEA's enforcement agency, is willing to make automatic approval
of waivers in these circumstances, the courts should certainly consider the
circumstances in individual cases where similar factors exist under an
agreement to arbitrate instead of a total waiver. It seems evident that the
EEOC does not share the Nicholson court's fear that all compliance with
the ADEA must be overseen by the EEOC.s°
Furthermore, while the ADEA itself encourages the EEOC to first
attempt to effect voluntary compliance with the statute "through informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion,""' the Nicholson
court bars enforcement of a voluntary agreement between the employer
46. 687 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
47. Id. at 1192.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c)(1) (1990). But see Pub. L. No. 100-459, Title 5, 102
Stat. 2216 (1988) (expired Sept. 30, 1989, wherein Congress suspended these EEOC rules
by using appropriations bills).
49. Id. § 1627.16(c)(2).
50. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 237 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, C.J.,
dissenting).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
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and employee to settle the dispute through arbitration when an employee
later decides to bring an ADEA action in violation of that agreement.
IV. LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE OF ADEA
Since there is no explicit language in the ADEA as to the
arbitration of claims, courts and commentators turn to the legislative
history of the Act. Opponents of arbitration agreements and private
waivers of ADEA claims argue that by placing enforcement powers in the
EEOC, Congress meant to cut off any avenues bypassing this agency
involvement. However, these opponents ignore the fact that "the
individual's right under [the] ADEA to seek redress against an employer
for age discrimination is subordinate to the enforcement activities of the
public agency charged with the Act's administration. '6 What these
opponents forget is that a waiver or a private agreement to arbitrate does
not conflict with congressional intent to bar discrimination on the basis of
age, because the individual's agreement bars only his own recovery in
private suits or in an EEOC suit on his behalf. The EEOC still has the
statutory responsibility to eliminate age discrimination in employment and
pursue charges against an employer. Thus, an employer's agreement to
arbitrate ADEA claims does not interfere with the EEOC's statutory
enforcement powers.
In Gilmer, the court emphatically stated that:
We find nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying
purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to
preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements. . . . Courts
should be reluctant, however, to imply in a statute an intention to
preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements where Congress
has not expressed one, particularly in light of countervailing
intention expressed by Congress in the FAA.3
While Congress made a deliberate decision to make ADEA claims
enforceable under the FLSA, ADEA is a separate statute with separate
goals for protecting a different class of persons; therefore, it must be
analyzed separately. In ADEA cases, the plaintiff may be a well-
educated, long-term employee, who in fact has the ability and desire to
reach an individual agreement with his employer.# The Runyan court
52. Nicholsonv. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989).
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
54. See Comment, supra note 32, at 1078 (citing Schuster & Miller, An Empirical




stated that ADEA cases may be "very different from cases concerning
releases of FLSA claims by lay persons seeking payment of minimum
wages, in amounts ascertainable by uncomplicated methods, usually with
little knowledge of their legal rights." ss  Furthermore, a blanket
disallowance of arbitration agreements of ADEA claims may be an
overprotective move by the court, based on the court's view of the
disparity of bargaining power between employers and employees. This
problem may not be as pervasive with older employees as is the case in
other employment disputes; however, when it is present, the facts can be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
In Nicholson, the plaintiff was an attorney employed by the
company for twenty-five years. It is difficult to justify the court's overall
ban of arbitration agreements, especially when applied to the facts of this
case. Many cases exist in which an individual employee has made an
informed, educated decision to arbitrate claims and then later changed his
mind for an unjustified reason and brings an ADEA suit. To make such a
general rule of law as the court did in Nicholson oversteps the boundaries
of judicial power.
The Nicholson court's reliance on the Barrentine, Alexander, and
McDonald line of cases seems inappropriate. First, those cases do not
apply to the ADEA. Congress made a deliberate decision to exclude age
from Title* VII coverage and obviously recognized the special
characteristics that separate age from other protected classes as well as
from those classes covered by FLSA and § 1983.!6 Furthermore,
agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims deserve a more careful analysis in
light of the Supreme Court's strong endorsement of arbitration in the
commercial setting. Mitsubishi, McMahon, and Rodriguez were all
decided after the employment cases on which the majority in Nicholson
relies. The Nicholson court seems to base its decision on past
employment cases not entirely on point, instead of looking at the
particular purposes of the ADEA and the growth in the acceptance and
sophistication of arbitration by the Supreme Court and the legal
community.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Since neither the ADEA nor its legislative history gives a clear
picture of whether ADEA rights can be privately released by individual
agreements to arbitrate, the courts should consider the public policy
55. Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register, 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1986).
56. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
AcT 8, 14 (1981).
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ramifications of its decisions. The Act was intended to outlaw arbitrary,
unjustified employment discrimination against older workers and was
aimed toward expanding job opportunities for those individuals. The
ADEA was not intended to take away freedom of choice and contract
from older workers, many of whom are fully capable of negotiating with
their long-term employers.
ADEA sponsors encouraged informal resolution of ADEA claims.
S7
The statute contains no language prohibiting private agreements, but the
Nicholson court seems to cut off the agreement-to-arbitrate option of older
workers and their employers. Sponsors stated that the ADEA should
allow the employee "to resolve the dispute himself or work out a
compromise with an employer."S' Another sponsor pointed out the huge
backlogs and long delays of the EEOC, and stressed that these delays are
even more unfortunate in the case of "older citizens to whom, by
definition, relatively few productive years are left."s9 It seems contrary to
the interests of the older workers, whom the legislation was designed to
protect, that courts have construed the ADEA to prevent them from
reaching "voluntary and knowing" agreements with their employers.
It must be noted that age is neither a "suspect class" nor is it an
"immutable characteristic," such as race or national origin, that warrants
heightened scrutiny by the courts. As stated by one court:
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the very
nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the usual case, absent
any discriminatory intent, discharged employees will more often
than not be replaced by those younger than they, for older
employees are constantly moving out of the labor market, while
younger ones move in. This factor of progression and
replacement is not necessarily involved in cases involving the
immutable characteristics of race, sex and national origin. Thus,
while the principal thrust of the Age Act is to protect the older
worker from victimization by arbitrary classification on account of
age, we do not believe Congress intended automatic presumptions
to apply whenever a worker is replaced by another of a different
age.-
57. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
58. The Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989 Committee
on Labor and Human Resources Repon together with Minority Views, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., Rep. 79, at 32 (1989) (minority view of Senators Hatch, Jeffords, Thurmond,
Durenberger, and Coats quoting 123 Cong. Rec. S. 17275 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977)
[hereinafter Waiver Act Repon]) (emphasis in original).
59. Id. (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 786
Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Public Welfare, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24-25 (1967)).
60. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Therefore, while the policy of the ADEA is obviously to protect older
workers, the Constitution limits the degree of protection courts or
Congress can provide before jeopardizing employee benefits, precluding
knowing and voluntary choices, or limiting the opportunities for
agreements to arbitrate or waivers available to older workers.
The Nicholson court seemed to forget that employers are not
without limits on their rights to obtain arbitration or waiver agreements
from employees: first, the agreements must be voluntary and knowing;
second, the EEOC still has the statutory right to enforce ADEA violations
even in light of a waiver of employee rights; and third, there is an
opportunity for limited judicial review of arbitrators' decisions.
Courts should establish standards to determine if arbitration
agreements signed by older employees are indeed voluntary and knowing.
The following factors, put forth by the Third Circuit in determining the
validity of waivers, could also be applied to agreements to arbitrate:
(1) The clarity and specificity of the release language.
(2) The plaintiff's education and business experience.
(3) The amount of time the plaintiff had for deliberation
with respect to the release before signing.
(4) Whether the plaintiff knew or should have known his
rights upon execution of the release.
(5) Whether the plaintiff was encouraged to seek, or in fact
received benefit of, counsel.
(6) Whether there was an opportunity for negotiation of the
terms of the agreement.
(7) Whether the consideration given in exchange for the
waiver and accepted by the employee exceeded the
benefits to which the employee was already entitled by
contract or law.61
Furthermore, the Federal Arbitration Association (FAA) provides
four opportunities for judicial review in which a court may vacate an
arbitrator's award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
61. Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988).
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(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter was not made.'
Thus, an older employee who signs an agreement to arbitrate is not giving
up his substantive ADEA rights; he is merely submitting the dispute to an
arbitrator instead of a court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The language, history, and public policy considerations of the
ADEA do not justify a per se rule that bars arbitration agreements in
which employees waive their right to file a private ADEA claim. The
Nicholson court's holding that arbitrary agreements are inherently
inconsistent with the statutory scheme for enforcement of the ADEA and
thus, age discrimination claims are not subject to arbitration, is an
overstepping of judicial authority. The court failed to properly balance
the rights of employees and employers to make voluntary and knowing
agreements against the desire to protect older employees and the rationale
of the ADEA. As one opponent of such drastic outlawing of agreements
said, "[p]recluding settlement simply because they might insulate a
potential wrongdoer from a possible adverse judicial finding would appear
largely inconsistent with the generally accepted notion that the voluntary
resolution of disputes between parties in the employment context is
preferable to litigation."'2
The interests of older workers must also be considered in light of
the reality of tremendous backlogs of charges filed with the EEOC and the
already overburdened courts. The Nicholson court should have also
considered that employers may now be discouraged from offering early-
retirement packages to workers in the absence of assurances of protection
from ADEA suits, resulting in an obvious detriment to older workers.
Furthermore, the older workers who were to be protected by the ADEA
are now precluded from negotiating on their own behalf and making
certain agreements with their employers. This result seems to perpetuate
societal attitudes that older people cannot function on their own -- which
is precisely one of the stereotypes the ADEA was designed to eliminate.
The absence of language in the ADEA banning private agreements
and the individual's right to make contracts conflicts with the Nicholson
court's destruction of private arbitration agreements. Until Congress
decides to clear up the ambiguity in the ADEA, the courts should decide
on a case-by-case basis whether the employee in fact made a voluntary
62. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
63. Waiver Act Report, supra note 58, at 30.
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and knowing agreement to waive his private ADEA rights and subject
them to arbitration, which should be upheld by the courts. The Supreme
Court will hopefully clear up this issue when it hears Gilmer."
Ellen Toth
64. See note 10, supra.

